Power, Influence, and Authority: The Hazards of Carrying a Sword

Morgan W. McCall, Jr.

Technical Report
Center for Creative Leadership
EDITORIAL POLICY

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(919) 288-7210
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THE HAZARDS OF CARRYING A SWORD

Morgan W. McCall, Jr.

Technical Report Number 10
August 1978

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5000 Laurinda Drive
Greensboro, North Carolina 27402

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Grid, Inc., Columbus, Ohio, 1979
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ISBN 0-912879-09-2
Abstract

This review examines three aspects of power: its sources, its use, and its impact.

The Sources of Power

Power often arises from position. Position enhances power when incumbents are not easily replaced, are interconnected with many others in the organization, and have a shot at important problems and emergencies. Another source of power is control of certain resources, including information, rewards and punishments, expertise, and influence on organizational structure. But anything that is valued by the organization can become a resource that endows its controller with power. A third source of power is timing, which means coordinating position and resources to deal effectively with problems. A problem that arises at the wrong time can diminish power. Finally, power breeds power. The successful wielding of power increases the odds that the powerful will gain even more power for the future. Since there are many ways to get power, many people in organizations have power of some kind. The question is, who has the power to get things done?

The Use of Power

The powerful use power under three principal conditions: when resources are allocated, when there is a relatively wide latitude to make decisions, and when uncertainty surrounds either goals or the means of achieving goals. The tactics of using power vary from assertion and bargaining to manipulation and threat, with the choice of tactics being controlled by position, resources, timing, past performance, and the circumstances at the time.

The Impact of Power

Power is a two-edged sword: One edge can solve problems and generate more power; the other edge is used defensively, to protect power, causing restraints against its use. Thus, power must be exercised with care and responsibility, which requires understanding what power is and how to use it.
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Introduction

The power of the chief executive is hard to achieve, balky to manage, and incredibly difficult to exercise . . . . Many new Presidents, attempting to exert executive power, have felt it slip from their fingers and have faced a rebellious Congress and an adamant civil service, a respectfully half-obedient military, a suspicious Supreme Court, a derisive press, and a sullen electorate.

(Steinbeck, 1966, p. 48)

Power seems to be everywhere. From the President's office to the bureaucrat's desk, the exercise of power is a visible part of our daily life. It can be observed in families, street gangs, and all organizations. Further evidence of its ubiquity is the variety of disciplines which try to deal with it: sociology, philosophy, political science, psychology, and law (to name only a few).

Steinbeck's observation of the vagaries of power is a useful way to begin a discourse on the subject. He has taken what is often called "the most powerful position on earth" and suggested that power is neither absolute nor easy to use. Cohen and March (1974) found the same kind of thing when they examined the office of college president:

The college president has more potential for moving the college than most people, probably more potential than any one other person. Nevertheless, presidents discover that they have less power than is believed, that their power to accomplish things depends heavily on what they want to accomplish, that the use of formal authority is limited by other formal authority, that the acceptance of authority is not automatic, that the necessary details of organizational life confuse power (which is somewhat different from diffusing it), and that their colleagues seem to delight in complaining simultaneously about presidential weakness and presidential willfulness. (pp. 197-198)

There is a temptation to think of power as something tangible, especially when someone else has it. But from the powerholder's viewpoint, power may be "situational and mercurial; it resists attempts to locate in the way a molecule under the Heisenberg principle resists attempts simultaneously
to locate it and time its velocity" (Riesman, p. 257, cited in Kornberg & Perry, 1966).

Many fail to realize the slipperiness of power because it is thought of in one of two ways. First power is often viewed as a function of position or role. That is, certain offices in organizations carry with them a great deal of formal authority, control over significant resources, high visibility, and prestige and status. Incumbents of such offices are seen as powerful by definition.

A second view of power is based in historical perspectives. Individuals are seen as powerful because of their impact on the course of history. Generally, the dramatic accomplishments of such people are seen as a result of personal power; through personal strength and will they overcame resistance or obstacles to achieve dramatic ends. When these ends were noble, the individuals are often viewed as strong leaders or benevolent dictators. When the ends were evil, the words despot, dictator, autocrat, authoritarian are more descriptive. Since many of the powerful characters in history achieved their fame through tyranny, it is easy to equate power with corruption and abuse. Suspicions about power are clearly reflected by Lord Acton's popular quote on the power of power to corrupt.

These two popular views of power, the power of office and historical impact, point out that understanding power involves a look at both possession and the ability to use what is possessed (Pettigrew, 1972). In addition, forces that affect the translation from possession to use must be examined. This paper will attack the problem by examining (1) how power, influence, authority, and related terms might be defined, (2) the sources and origins of power, (3) when and how it is used, and (4) the impact of power use.

Because power is a ubiquitous social phenomenon and because a variety of approaches has been used to study it, the domain of this paper must be limited. Power and related concepts will be considered as they exist in an organizational context. Material related to power as it functions in other settings, e.g., the family, or as an element of socio-political philosophy, e.g., democratic government, will not be treated here.

Further, I will rely primarily on research reports and on efforts to construct theoretical frameworks for understanding power. The ambiguity of these literatures is a more than adequate challenge, without the further complication of trying to sort out the myriad of popular writings on the subject.
Power: What Does It Mean? Where Do We Stand?

Even though power has been a focus of analysis since antiquity (see Dahl, 1957, p. 32), our understanding of it is far from complete. Review articles on power and related words have appeared with some regularity. The authors' assessments of "the state of the art" are enlightening, if not encouraging. Figure 1 (see page 33) presents some of these comments in chronological order.

The definitional problems and their endurance over time accurately reflect the complexity of the topic. Without some agreement on what is being looked at, it is not surprising that there is "an anarchy of concepts and empirical data" (Tedeschi & Bonoma, 1972, p. 1). Definitions of power vary in their consideration of the use of force. Many treat power as an imposition of will--an overcoming of resistance to get others to do something they wouldn't do otherwise (Etzioni, 1968; Mechanic, 1962; Minton, 1972; Weber, 1947/1964). Other approaches are even more sinister, focusing on the use of coercion to attain one's ends (Fried, 1967; Lasswell & Kaplan, 1950; Stotland, 1959).

Definitions also vary in the extent to which they restrict power to interpersonal relationships (e.g., Cartwright & Zander, 1968, pp. 215-216) as opposed to influence over processes (Kanter, 1977). That is, many approaches view power as something a specific person (or group) does to another specific person (or group). John got Mary to give him $5. Other approaches include a person's power over things or processes. For example, influencing budget allocation decisions involves different people in different ways at different times.

Another definitional bone of contention is the usefulness of examining "potential" power. A number of authors view power primarily in terms of its effects (Dahl, 1957; Harsanyi, 1962; Russell, 1938; Simon, 1957). In essence, what matters is not how much power one nominally has, or even that one uses the power, but that power is demonstrated only when an actor actively and deliberately gains compliance from another.

There are numerous other differences among definitions, including their degree of formality, specificity, empirical support, and general acceptance. Each way of conceptualizing power has strengths and weaknesses and leads to different hypotheses. Unfortunately, there is no simple way to resolve
the differences, and attempting to do so has already generated enough verbiage. Perrow (1970) argued that "a simple, consistent meaning of power, or decomposition of the concept into various types, might be preferable, but I doubt it" (p. 84). For the purposes of this paper, I will accept that there are many ways to define power and try to settle on a broad, general meaning to guide the discussion. To do this, a number of arbitrary decisions must be made.

First, a broad definition of power will allow consideration of more research evidence and will preserve more of the real complexity of power than will a narrow one. In this paper, therefore, power will not be limited to its coercive manifestations or to interpersonal phenomena. Following Kanter (1977) and Salancik and Pfeffer (1977), power is "simply the ability to get things done the way one wants them to be done" (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977, p. 4). It is the ability "to mobilize resources, to get and use whatever it is that a person needs for the goals he or she is attempting to meet" (Kanter, 1977, p. 166). By this definition power is influence over people, processes, and/or things. Further, power is neither inherently good nor evil. Power is. Value judgments can be applied to the means used to carry it out and to the goals or objectives sought. But these value judgments should not restrict our attention—the nature of power needs to be understood both to enhance our use of it for noble goals and to allow us to protect ourselves from the ignoble.

Second, as Pettigrew (1972) argued, power involves both possession and skills. It unrealistically bifurcates the phenomenon when the power a person has is treated separately from the power she or he actually uses. Numerous authors have attempted to label various aspects of power with words like influence, force, control, authority, and so on. The subtle distinctions drawn are hard to distinguish and are inconsistently applied across authors. Much of this confusion arises, as Dahl (1957) pointed out, because "power" has no verb form. Some authors treat influence as the power verb; others mean something entirely different. In this chapter, power and influence will be used interchangeably.

Third, authority will be treated as one source of power. It is the formal power conveyed to a person or position by the organization. Though many authors argue that authority is conveyed by agreement of the followers with norms, rules, procedures, etc. ("legitimate power"), I prefer the notion (Scott, Dornbusch, Busching, & Laing, 1967) that authority resides in actions supported by superiors. In other words, authority reflects the organization's judgment of what a particular person in a particular role has the right to do.
Subordinates may choose to resist or subvert, try to change the organization, or argue about legitimacy, but they do not confer authority in most organizations. (Even in a truly democratic organization, followers typically confer the rights to authority, but not the authority directly). Thus, authority is one source of power conferred by the organization or system.

Fourth, power is both relational (Emerson, 1962) and systemic (Pettigrew, 1973). It involves a social network of people, all of whom have varying degrees and types of power available to them, and an organization or system which structures relationships, work flows, rewards, authority, information flows, etc. It further involves the interface between the organization and its environment. The environment can affect directly the way an organization is structured and some of the problems on which power can be used.

While some students of power choose to focus on individual personality or motives, such considerations alone are not sufficient to explain the workings of power in organizations (Emerson, 1962; Kanter, 1977; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). Personality factors do relate to power in various ways. They have some influence on who seeks power in the first place (Kipnis, 1976), whether or not power use is constrained (Kipnis, 1976), and on the tactics employed in using power (e.g., Christie & Geis, 1970). There is substantial evidence, however, that having and using power causes (as opposed to results from) certain individual characteristics (Kipnis, 1976).

In summary, the ambiguities of power have befuddled practitioner and scholar alike. Continued debate has refined the nature of the disagreements, but has not resolved them. This does not mean that nothing is known, but it does make the starting place a bit arbitrary. Power is a complex topic, worthy more of continued thinking than of drawing conclusions.

I will begin by viewing power in an organizational context as the ability to marshal the human, informational, and material resources to get something done. This marshaling is intimately interwoven with the social network; the structure, culture, and problems of the organization; and the nature of the organization/environment interface. Because of this, understanding power involves understanding positions in social and organizational frameworks, as well as the assets brought to the position.
Sources and Origins of Power: Forging a Sword

Power, like heat, has many sources. The relevance of particular sources of power to a powerholder's ability to act will depend on what he or she is trying to accomplish. In some cases, a single source of influence will be enough; in other cases, multiple sources will be required. Some sources have substitutes, others may not.

There are many typologies and frameworks for looking at sources of power (e.g., French & Raven, 1959; Raven, 1965). The differences among them, like the differences among the definitions of power that inspired them, are great. When the various approaches are combined, however, it seems that power is in large part a function of being in the right place, at the right time, with the right resources, and doing the right thing.

As obvious as this modified truism might seem, it bears a closer look. Power acquisition is not a matter of pure luck or personal force, and it is possible to predict with some accuracy where power will reside in an organization. If power is to be maintained, individuals must be proactive in finding their places, times, and resources. Just as challenging, of course, is doing the right things with some consistency once the other elements are tended to.

The Right Place

Being in the right place is an important basis of power for many reasons. To the extent that power in organizations results from the division of labor (Hickson, Hinings, Lee, Schneck, & Pennings, 1971), one's place in that division is a critical source of power. Position in the hierarchy, work flow, and communication network contributes not only to formal authority (see The Right Resources, page 9) but also to the kinds of problems the incumbent will be able to confront.

The "strategic contingencies" theory of power (Hickson et al., 1971; Hinings, Hickson, Pennings, & Schneck, 1974; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977) offers a simple but compelling argument:

Those subunits most able to cope with the organization's critical problems and uncertainties acquire power. In its simplest form, the strategic contingencies theory implies that when an organization
faces a number of lawsuits that threaten its existence, the legal department will gain power and influence over organizational decisions. (pp. 4-5)

Thus, one step in the acquisition of power is being in a position to deal with the organizational problems that press (Kanter, 1977) or to decide in emergencies (Tedeschi & Bonoma, 1972). An individual or unit, by virtue of confronting critical contingencies, is in a position to gain power.

Clearly, formal position in an organization plays an important part in determining who has a shot at strategic contingencies. High magnitude problems are just more likely to land on the president's desk than on a supervisor's. If wild sales fluctuations are a major problem, people in sales or marketing are likely to face the problem first. But the strategic contingencies theory is quite explicit: Power comes to those who can cope with the major uncertainties. In the absence of coping, owning major problems is a risky business (see The Right Action, page 12).

While formal position is a major determinant of opportunities to cope with (or avoid) strategic contingencies, not all glory is thrust upon those who happen to be in the right place. Major organizational problems are complex, ambiguous, and involve many people (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976). Organizations can move people across positions; people can "jockey" their own positions; and, as a problem flows through an organization, it may be resolved by a functionally-removed person or unit. Thus power accumulation is dynamic, changing as problems and problem-solvers change.

Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) argued that power shifts that match changing demands are the key to organizational adaptation and survival. As both internal and external problems shift, power should also shift to the parts of the organization able to cope with the new demands. If power is not allowed to shift (powerholders are often reluctant to give up their power) or if the major problems are misdefined (thus giving power to the wrong person), the organization's ability to survive becomes threatened.

Since power is the ability to get something done, mismatched power is likely to produce visible symptoms. Powerholders may search for problems on which they can use their power, redefining or ignoring the real problems. Cohen and March (1974) have elaborated the theme of solutions in search of problems, an extension of the small boy with a hammer phenomenon.
Power accrued through dealing with structural contingencies is enhanced by at least two other factors: nonsubstitutability and centrality (Hickson et al., 1971). Nonsubstitutability refers to a person's or unit's uniqueness. If skills or expertise are important and are difficult to replace, the possessor (unit or person) of those skills gains power. If there is only one person on the ship who can keep the engines running, he or she is a powerful person. The one person who understands the computer program that handles the organization's financial system is powerful.

Centrality refers to the interconnectedness of a person or unit. Simply put, the more parts of the organization that depend on you, the more power you have. Engine failure without our hypothetical ship's mechanic would affect every job on the ship. Every part of the organization faces chaos if the computer fouls up the financial reporting system.

In summary, power comes from being in the right place. You can go a long way toward predicting the power distribution in an organization if you identify the persons or units that (1) cope with strategic contingencies (the major uncertainties confronting the organization), (2) cannot be easily replaced and (3) are functionally interconnected with many other people or units (Hinings et al., 1974). As sources of power, these elements are dynamic. All three change over time as a function of the changing environment and of changing organizational structures.

These power sources also change because they are, at least in part, dependent on perception. What the strategic contingencies actually are and what the organization thinks they are may be two different things. This suggests another source of power: the ability to define the organization's major problems. Those who already have power are likely to be the ones defining the problems for the organization, thereby stabilizing the power structure.

There is a tension, then, between the dynamic and the stable aspects of power. Just who will be in the right place to gain power is not simply a product of the formal structure of the organization. It involves political, perceptual, and ability dimensions as well as environmental and structural factors.

The Right Time

It follows immediately that the right place is intimately connected with timing. Opportunities to tackle strategic
contingencies, to deal with extraordinary situations, handle crises, or provide unique expertise are temporally related. To the extent that these opportunities are generated outside of the person or unit, the capacity to gain power from them is dependent on when they appear. If resources to cope with an opportunity are unavailable, confrontation is likely to reduce rather than enhance power.

Unfortunately, little research exists on the relationship between timing and power. Threats to the existing power distribution, such as innovations in technology, are likely to create political behavior in organizations (Pettigrew, 1973). Those in a position to make decisions about the acquisition and allocation of a new resource stand to gain power. Since the resource is new, and therefore creates uncertainty, numerous people may struggle for control of it.

Timing, then, is important because (1) the opportunity to cope will depend on being in a position to do something when a problem comes along, (2) the ability to cope successfully will depend upon having the resources needed to handle the problem, (3) a critical, insoluble problem at the wrong time can seriously reduce the power of being in the right place, and (4) the appearance of new resources or reallocation of the old represents a threat to existing or developing power distributions. Timing is also an important element in the tactics of power use, a topic we will discuss later.

The Right Resources

Control of resources has been a major theme in the research on power. "Subunit power accrues to those departments that are most instrumental in bringing in or providing resources which are highly valued by the total organization" (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974). These resources include control of information (Mechanic, 1962; Pettigrew, 1972), rewards and punishments (French & Raven, 1959), expertise (Pettigrew, 1973), anything valued by others that they cannot get elsewhere (Kipnis, 1976), and the authority to influence organizational structure (Kanter, 1977; Pettigrew, 1973). Control of resources is partially (but certainly not totally) determined by one's position in the organizational structure. Higher levels in the hierarchy normally carry with them greater formal authority. Authority at higher levels normally includes rights to sensitive information, the ability to apply the formal reward system (e.g., allocate raises or promotions, or terminations), and the ability to restructure the organization. All of these are sources of power.
Location in the work flow can provide access to additional resources. Organizations differentially distribute money, personnel, equipment, staff, etc. Other things being equal, people or units with control of more of these things have more potential power than those with less, especially as such resources grow scarce. Scarce resources create dependence, and dependence means someone has power (Mechanic, 1962).

Information is another resource that frequently accrues by virtue of work flow location. In the days of the manual switchboard, the operator was said to know more than any other member about the organization. While technology has reduced the power of the operator, information remains unequally distributed in organizations. By virtue of knowing more, organizational gatekeepers gain power. The magnitude of that power is determined by a number of things, including the relevance of the information to others or to the organization, the number of people with access to it, the receiver's control over dissemination of it, etc. (see Figure 2, page 35). The salesperson with direct contact with the company's largest client may have information giving him or her power well beyond hierarchical level. An isolated executive with only a few yes-men as sources may have little power in spite of his or her authority.

People represent another resource that can enhance power. Since virtually all members of an organization have power of one sort or another, alliances can increase power dramatically (Kanter, 1977; Pfeffer, 1977). My department and yours together may get more done than either could alone. Alliances or coalitions often form because of a high magnitude threat from a common enemy, and members may not know (or may even dislike) one another. But in the day-to-day functioning of an organization, many other kinds of coalitions and alliances form based on mutual interest. Making effective use of potential allies would seem to require a network of contacts in the organization and some information regarding their interests (Pettigrew, 1973). Part of such a network would result from a person's or unit's centrality (see The Right Place, page 6), part of it from accessing information, and part from contacts built over a person's career.

In addition to the grist for alliances, the interpersonal network can have other benefits. To the extent that it includes people with power in their own right, the network can provide political access (Pettigrew, 1975) to information or to events (such as membership on strategic committees). The network can also generate sponsors (Kanter, 1977)—people with clout who can provide opportunities or resources to others less powerful than themselves.
The number of resources that can serve as a power base are limited only by the imagination. One other resource we will consider here is the individual. Whereas many of the resources considered so far are intimately tied to position in the hierarchy, work flow, structure, etc., there are resources less affected by role. Among them are expertise and personality.

In one study we interviewed a manufacturing executive in a large manufacturing firm. Impressed by his relative youth and power, we asked him about his career. He answered, "I love messes." He had moved rapidly from one part of the organization to another, solving problems as he went. At one point he successfully managed a group of engineers, even though he could not read a blueprint. As a result, he became an expert at fixing messes and gained more and more power.

Expertise is a resource and a power base, albeit a tricky one. As with other power bases, it is firmer when it is rare and relevant. A person with specialized technical knowledge has power only so long as the technology remains similar and the number of equally capable people remains small. On the other hand, less specific expertise is more portable from position to position. Our manufacturing executive was a proven problem solver. He had wide knowledge of the organization and how it worked. His expertise, at least as perceived by those above him in the hierarchy, was both rare and relevant and likely to remain so.

Expertise, both specific and generic, is one key to getting involved with strategic contingencies. A reasonable organization will attempt to respond to major problems by finding internal or external experts. When faced with financial problems, the organization will seek financial wizards. The power acquired by the experts in this situation, if they are successful in solving the problem (see The Right Action, page 12), can extend far beyond the specific area in which they are expert (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977).

A major problem with expert power as a power base is that it depends on the perceptions of others. Research has shown that such perceptions are not always accurate (e.g., Patchen, 1974). Further, expert contributions, especially specific and technical ones, are quickly used up. If the problem is solved, the need for the expert (and therefore his or her power) evaporates. In short, expertise is a tricky power base because (1) others have to believe you have it, (2) you have to be visible enough to be called upon to use it, and (3) the very use of it may obviate the need for it. To
enhance power in the long run, expertise probably has to apply to a recurrent problem or to extend over several important areas (note the current popularity of combined MBA and law degrees), and it should be coupled with other power bases.

Finally, the accumulation of power is in part dependent on personal characteristics. For example, some people seem to be more motivated than others to obtain and use power. Power motivation, at least as described by McClelland and Burnham (1976), is not a hunger for dictatorship. Rather it is a desire to have an impact, to be strong and influential. Such motivation would seem an appropriate concomitant for the responsibilities power conveys, since inability or reluctance to use power when it is needed can have enormous organizational consequences.

In summary, control of resources represents a broad array of power sources. Virtually anything that is relatively scarce and desired by others can be viewed as a resource that gives power to whomever controls it. These resources range from information through rewards and punishments to individual qualities. They include people, commodities, knowledge, authority, and more. They include the ability to obtain resources needed by the organization from outside, as well as control over internal resource distribution. Presumably, the more important resources controlled, the more power accrued. Effective use of such power, however, will depend on the way it is used and on the particular goals sought through its use.

The Right Action

Cohen and March (1974) point out that "power" is prone to tautology: "A person has power if he gets things done; if he has power he can get things done" (p. 197). If it is tautological, it seems nonetheless true. Recall that strategic contingencies theory explicitly states that the actor must cope with the contingency. Dealing with relevant issues is insufficient as a power base unless one deals effectively (however that is defined). Success (or, more accurately, perceived success) is itself a power base. To get something done, a person must have some power. If he or she gets something done, more power is a likely result. Being in the right place at the right time with the right resources carries with it considerable pressure to do the right thing.
An executive we interviewed captured the organizational perspective on successful managers:

Every manager is expected to pull one or two major boners in his career. A good manager has to take some risks, and even the best will make mistakes. But you're only allowed one or two—beyond that you're in trouble.

By virtue of their position and authority, managers (especially at higher levels) have power. Because people attribute power to position, status, prestige, etc., others are likely to believe the incumbent has more power than he or she actually has (Pondy, 1977). The incumbent, prior to actually trying to use power, is likely to make a similar assumption. Cohen and March (1974), in their study of university presidents, captured the dilemma:

He is faced with a disparity between his potential power and beliefs about his power that assures his disappointment and the disappointment of others in his ability to act powerfully. He is resented because he is more powerful than he should be. He is scorned and frustrated because he is weaker than he is believed capable of being. If he acts as a "strong" president, he exposes his weakness. If he acts as a "democratic" president, people consider him timid. (p. 116)

In spite of the gap between potential and actual power, successful use of power does increase power. In their study of university budgeting, Pfeffer and Salancik (1974) found that already-powerful departments had more influence over budget decisions, regardless of department work load or student demand. Their measures of power included many indices of past power use, including impact on earlier decisions and participation on major university committees. Providing the university with important resources enabled "these subunits to obtain more of those scarce and critical resources allocated within the organization" (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974, p. 470).

In short, successful power use leads to more power. Given some power base to start with, successful action (in this case, providing needed resources) leads to more power (in the form of additional resources). In addition, it is likely that the departments bringing in these resources gain in esteem (itself a power source; Pettigrew, 1975; Tedeschi & Bonoma, 1972) and in the belief by others that they share important values (again, shared values are a power base according to French and Raven, 1959).
Another benefit of success with power is the acquisition of human resources. It seems that powerful bosses like powerful subordinates (within limits) and that people like to work for powerful bosses (Kanter, 1977). The boss can get more done if the subordinates also can get things done, and subordinates are more likely to progress if the boss has enough power to provide opportunities and resources. A side benefit of successful use of power, then, is the possible accumulation of people who possess the skills and resources that can enhance that power.

Patchen (1974) has suggested that action per se is a source of influence. This is particularly true when there are problems lying around but nobody has done anything about them.

In summary, successful use of power leads to more power for a variety of reasons. Particularly in the face of uncertainty (Pfeffer, Salancik, & Leblebici, 1976), the organization is likely to turn to people or units which, from its point of view, have the best track record. Track records are determined, at least in part, by the use of power in the past.

Conclusions

The origins of power are complex and diverse. Research to date has identified many power sources but has not yet produced a comprehensive framework for relating them to each other or to outcome variables. Because there are so many ways to get power, virtually all members of an organization have it. The question is not so much who has power, but what people have the most relevant power and what they are doing with it. Power accrues from position, timing, resources, and past action. From what has been discussed so far, one would expect a strong power base when people or units (1) are in a position to deal with important problems facing the organization, (2) have control over significant resources valued by others, (3) are lucky enough or skilled enough to bring problems and resources together at the same time, (4) are centrally connected in the work flow of the organization, (5) are not easily replaced or substituted, and (6) have successfully used their power in the past.

Within each of these six elements are nested numerous specific sources of power, from types of authority to personality characteristics. Exactly which and how many power sources are needed to accomplish a given objective is highly
dependent on the objective and on the temporal context. It is one thing to have a power base, but quite another to convert that potential into accomplishment (Pettigrew, 1973). In the next section we will examine the forces that influence the use of power and the tactics employed in its use.
The Use of Power: Drawing the Sword

He drew his sword and looked at it, and the intertwining shapes of red and gold; and the flowing characters of Numenor glinted like fire upon the blade. "This was made for just such an hour," he thought.

(Tolkien, 1965, p. 168)

Sometimes just carrying an impressive sword is not enough. It must be drawn. In organizations, power is and always will be used. "Unless goals and criteria are shared among all participants in the organization, the use of power and influence is inevitable in organizational decision making" (Pfeffer, 1977, p. 239). The issues are simply when and how power will be used. In this section we will explore some of the factors influencing the decision to use power, then delve into some power tactics and factors affecting tactical choices.

Deciding to Use Power

As is the case with research on other aspects of power, the evidence on when power is used is fragmented. Only a few of the many possible elements going into use decisions will be considered here.

Except in unusual circumstances, power is not used indiscriminately. At a minimum, power use expends some of the resources of the powerholder (Pfeffer, 1977). Moreover, everyone has at least some power, so indiscriminate power use is likely to have repercussions of a subtle (e.g., everyone suddenly stops talking to you) or more blatant (e.g., a strike) nature. Especially in situations where the targets of influence do not share the influencer's goals, the wise powerholder is circumspect about applying his or her power. Three conditions affecting the use of power have been suggested by Pfeffer (1977): characteristics of the resource, decision-maker discretion, and uncertainty. These three elements can be used to characterize a broad range of situations likely to bring about power use.

When resources are being allocated in an organization, the probability of power use increases if the resources involved are both scarce and critical to the person or unit (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1974). Further, use of power is predicated on decision-maker discretion. If external pressures,
such as legal restrictions, dictate how decisions will be made, using one's power internally will not have much effect on outcomes (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974).

In short, if critical and scarce resources are involved, and if there is some latitude in how decisions are to be made, affected people or units are likely to use their power. This use will be restricted by the sources on which the power is based and their applicability to the problem at hand.

The likelihood of power use is also enhanced when uncertainty surrounds either goals or the means for achieving them (Pfeffer, 1977). If the organization is unsure of what it should be doing or what it wants to accomplish, or both, power is likely to be used by various parties. In the face of ambiguity, various units or individuals seek to influence important decisions according to their own particularistic criteria.

Putting these various elements together, it is possible to describe a general set of situations in which power is likely to be used. Expect to see power in action when there is competition among individuals or units for scarce and critical resources, particularly when various powerholders have some discretion and there is uncertainty about goals and/or means to achieve goals. Remember that "resources" can include a broad array of things, including people, equipment, information, money, space, opportunities, etc. The competition for them need not be motivated by self-interest. Power is used selfishly, to be sure, but it is also used in pursuit of "getting things done." Various powerholders may believe that their goals are best for the organization. Particularly in the midst of uncertainty, power may be the only means of resolving disagreement. If power were equal throughout, the organization might do nothing at all or consistently settle for watered-down compromises. At a minimum, the presence of differential power represents potential movement, for good or for ill.

While power use is likely in a variety of situations, the specific people or units electing to use their power in a given situation will vary. Not all interested parties are likely to attach the same importance to a particular situation. Those who perceive that they have the most to gain or lose are more likely to consider using their power energetically. Since power use extracts costs, even those who consider the situation very important are likely to weigh their chances of success before mobilizing their power. This includes assessing the perceived power of other interested parties (Cartwright & Zander, 1968, pp. 218-219; Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). After all,
people who use power have to live with the consequences. To the extent that the situation is win-lose (one party gets all the goodies while the others get none), the potential losers may retaliate in a number of ways. Patchen (1974) found, for example, that the person most frequently having the most influence on purchasing decisions was the person most affected by what was purchased. The choice of a truck for a musical instruments firm was most influenced by the traffic supervisor who had to live with it. Patchen's conclusions are worthy of note:

The comments of many persons focused not on the fact that those affected pushed their preferences but that others thought it appropriate (other things roughly equal) to defer to those preferences. The key to understanding the influence of those most affected by a decision is, I suggest, that those affected persons are likely to react to the decision in a way which affects others. And others know this. (p. 217)

He went on to suggest that peers defer because the person most affected may (1) be angry, (2) reduce cooperation, or (3) oppose the peer in a later decision affecting the peer. Patchen deduced that "the characteristics which make certain persons influential include not only those which affect their control over resources but those (like being affected by a decision) that make credible their motivation to use the resources they possess" (p. 218).

In summary, decisions to use power are based on many factors. They involve the nature and importance of the situation at hand, the relative power of the interested parties involved, the degree to which power use is likely to have an effect on the outcome (discretion), and the potential consequences of power use. Formal constraints on power, such as judicial or legislative review or rights to appeal, are also factors to consider (Wrong, 1968). Indiscriminate use of power without regard for the contingencies involved frequently leads to disaster for both powerholder and those influenced (e.g., the case of Richard Nixon).

Power Tactics

Given that power is to be used, what form is that use likely to take? With the diversity of power sources and the range of situations in which power may be used, it is no surprise that specific power tactics are also numerous. As Tedeschi and Bonoma (1972) pointed out:
To focus upon the means by which one person can influence another is tantamount to examining all of the basic types of social interactions which can take place. (pp. 8-9)

An effort to even describe all possible power tactics, much less the pros and cons of each, is clearly beyond the scope of this paper. Figures 3, 4, and 5, however, present a variety of tactics noted in the literature on power use. Not only do these figures present a variety of tactics, but they also reflect different approaches and different settings. Falbo (1977) inductively arrived at the 16 categories in Figure 3 (see page 36) by asking 141 psychology students to write a paragraph about "how I get my way." Using multidimensional scaling techniques, Falbo found two dimensions: rational v. nonrational (is the tactic based more on reason or emotion) and direct v. indirect (is influence open and direct or more subtle, as in a hint).

Strauss (1962) derived the techniques in Figure 4 (see page 37) from an intensive study of 142 purchasing agents. Using informal contacts, observation, questionnaires, interviews, and archival records, Strauss examined how purchasing departments influenced other departments in their organizations. His five tactical categories--rule-oriented, rule-evading, personal-political, educational, and organizational-interactional--represent a range of tactics all used by agents at one time or another. He pointed out that agents are likely to use a mixture of tactics in dealing with a problem. Those agents seen as more successful in expanding their influence preferred to use less formal tactics (such as persuasion or inducement), but were equally adept in using more formal methods when appropriate.

Figure 5 (see page 38) shows the influence methods derived by Kotter (1977) from a clinical study of 26 organizations. He classified the tactics according to whether they involve face-to-face (direct) or indirect influence. He concluded, as did Strauss, that successful managers are able to and do use all the influence methods.

These three lists are not exhaustive (see, for example, Pettigrew, 1975; Pfieffer, 1977; Pondy, 1977; Tedeschi & Bonoma, 1972). But if listing the tactics available is an onerous task, understanding the factors affecting tactical choice is even more mind-boggling. Picking a tactic (or combination of tactics) depends on many elements, and existing research on the topic is fragmented and incomplete.

Clearly, choice of tactics is constrained by the power base of the user. Tactics based on formal authority, for
example, are not usable unless the powerholder has that authority. Giving or withholding information is not possible unless the powerholder has control of the information. Indirect influence may be difficult if one has no network of contacts or no control over structural relationships. The broader the power base, then, the more tactics there are available.

Clearly, too, the choice of tactics is situation dependent. Both Kotter (1977) and Strauss (1962) observed that effective use of power was contingent on the user's sensitivity to the particular situation, to the tactical choices, and to the people involved. There is some agreement among researchers that effective use of power begins with more subtle tactics, evolving to harsher methods only as required. Strauss's (1962) purchasing agents, for example, tried to exert influence informally until there was open conflict. As expectations for successful influence decrease, stronger methods are used (Kipnis, 1976).

In general, then, reliance on tactics based on formal authority, especially coercion, is reserved for situations in which other methods have failed or in which immediate compliance is essential. Kanter (1977) has gone so far as to argue that resorting to rules is a tactic of the powerless—it's all they have. This does not mean that powerful people will not use their authority, but simply that they are circumspect about it. Research supports this caution, especially in the use of coercion. Coercive tactics, while sometimes producing compliance in the short run, can reduce the recipients' satisfaction and future compliance (French & Raven, 1959; Leet-Pellegrini & Rubin, 1974; Stogdill, 1974). Sometimes use of authority does not even result in performance improvement (Thamhain & Gemmill, 1974). These negative consequences probably account for findings that managers infrequently use coercive power (Patchen, 1974).

In spite of this general trend, managers clearly respond differently in different situations. Goodstadt and Kipnis (1970) report that coercive power is likely to be used when poor performance is perceived to be caused by discipline problems. If the cause is perceived to be ineptness, the manager is more likely to utilize expertise-based power.

There are also relationships between personality characteristics and tactical choice. High self-confidence, for example, leads to more frequent use of both formal and informal power, while low confidence leads to an emphasis on formal power alone (Goodstadt & Kipnis, 1970).Externals (people who believe that events external to them are in control of
them) use coercive tactics while internals (who believe they have control over their own behavior) tend to rely on personal persuasion (Goodstadt & Hjelle, 1973). Some people are also less reluctant to use manipulation than others (Christie & Geis, 1970).

Still, tactical choices result from a complex interaction of forces. Power base, situation, judgment, and personality all play a part. One effort to conceptualize some of these forces appears in Tedeschi, Schlenker, and Bonoma (1973, p. 88). Using the powerholder’s control of resources and his or her intentions, they postulated a four-celled contingency table to predict tactical choice (Figure 6, see page 39). According to their model, a powerholder with direct control of valued resources, who intends to openly influence, will use threats and promises based on those resources. Without control of resources but with the same intention, the powerholder will resort to persuasive tactics.

Broadly Speaking

In summary, decisions to draw a sword and to use it in particular ways are not as simple as they may seem. Inept use of a sword is as likely to damage the user as it is the target—no matter how fancy the sword or regal the bearer. Few people in organizations are truly so powerful that they can use their power indiscriminately. Few also are so powerless that they can't accomplish a good deal through skilled applications of the power they do have. In organizations, getting things done requires the use of power. Truly effective members will use their own power judiciously, and do what they can to ensure that others do likewise. Swords have struck for as many good causes as evil ones. Power is a tool. It is neither inherently good nor evil.
The Impacts of Power: Who Gets Stuck?

Power use can have many impacts. Earlier, it was suggested that successful applications of power—in terms of solving critical problems or providing critical resources—serve to increase power. At the same time, changes in environmental demands, organizational restructuring, movement of personnel, and the appearance of new resources (or disappearance of the old) tend to shift power around in organizations. There is, therefore, a dynamic tension between power enhancement and power loss. Theoretically, this tension is an asset to the organization because power shifts to meet changing demands (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977), thereby permitting the organization to adapt as new problems appear. In many cases, however, the threat of power loss stimulates efforts to institutionalize existing power. One impact of power acquisition and use, then, is attempts by powerholders to protect their power base.

The use of power to protect power can take many forms. By virtue of their ability to determine organizational structure, powerholders may develop formal procedures for the distribution of information and resources, assuring their continued access and control (Strauss, 1962). Because power accrues to people or units who serve critical functions, powerholders may attempt to define their functions as critical even if they are not (Strauss, 1962). Thus, for example, power centers may attempt to define the critical problems of the organization in ways that preserve their own strategic importance. Since the ability to remove uncertainty is a power base, powerholders may in fact create uncertainty so they can enhance their power by removing it (Pondy, 1977).

Another element of power is nonsubstitutability. Protecting one's power can take the form of minimizing substitutes (Pondy, 1977) by hoarding critical information or resources, removing other powerholders (e.g., through transfer), or otherwise artificially enhancing the uniqueness of one's contribution.

In short, power impacts on organizations through efforts by powerholders to preserve the existing power distribution. Such preservation is dysfunctional to the extent that those with the power to get things done are not the ones confronting what needs to be done. Many organizations have faced major crises because of their inability to adapt (see Smith, 1963), an inability in part caused by inappropriate power distribution and the efforts to preserve it rather than the organization.
Clearly, power can be abused. Does it corrupt? There is some evidence that the exercise of power does cause changes in powerholders. Kipnis (1972) reported that use of power caused powerholders to (1) increase the number of times influence was attempted, (2) devalue the worth of the influenced person's performance, (3) attribute the cause of successful performance to him or herself rather than to the influenced person, (4) view the less powerful as objects of manipulation, and (5) express preferences for physical distance from the influenced. Power, then, can lead to devaluation of the less powerful (Kipnis, Castell, Gergen, & Mauch, 1976) and to increases in the powerholder's feelings of causation.

On the other hand, some have argued that powerlessness also corrupts (e.g., Kanter, 1977). Research is somewhat sparse on this issue, but it is reasonable to expect that efforts to accumulate power (or simply to gain independence from powerholders) have psychological impacts and can be equally dysfunctional for the organization.

Abuse of power and power-induced changes are in part offset by another impact of power: pressures not to use it. The forces against unbridled power use are many and come from many sources, both internal and external to the organization. Since certain kinds of situations are more likely than others to result in power use, rules and procedures to check abuses tend to develop. This is particularly true in recurring conflict situations, such as labor-management negotiations, which are subject to extensive procedural regulation. Federal, state, and local agencies attempt to define and control a variety of conflict situations by establishing guidelines, procedures, penalties, etc. All such regulations serve to limit the discretion of powerholders to exert influence on various spheres of activity.

Analogous regulation arises internally in organizations. Criteria may be established regarding budgetary decisions, for example, that limit the ability of any particular group to influence outcomes.

Formal mechanisms cannot completely control the use of power. They do, however, place limits on power use. Further, these mechanisms often result from abuses of power, causing powerholders to use power carefully lest they bring formal constraints on themselves.

Formal procedures and rules are not the only forces limiting power use. The targets of influence can and often do react to what they see as arbitrary power. They can seek alternate ways to obtain resources, form coalitions, withdraw,
counterattack in areas they can control, appeal to higher authority, and so forth. Few powerholders are so firmly entrenched that they can afford to ignore the reactions to power use.

Perhaps an even more compelling constraint on power use arises by virtue of organizational interdependence. To the extent that organizational units are dependent on one another, the struggle for scarce resources can have dire consequences—for example, the losers may cease to exist (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1974). In most organizations, subunits must continue to live together, and one group's privileges may be highly dependent on the privileges of other groups. Informal norms about what is fair, involving minimal standards of efficiency, are likely to develop (Pettigrew, 1973).

In summary, power is a two-edged sword. On one hand, it can be used to solve important organizational problems and its use tends to generate more power. On the other hand, the use of power can be misdirected to problems of power preservation and its use gives rise to constraints on its use.

The more powerful the position, the more complex power use becomes. Its potential for getting things done is confounded by the variety of situations faced and the cumulative countervailing forces surrounding them. Warren Bennis, then President of the University of Cincinnati, has described some of these forces:

In vital decisions I must consider not only our students, faculty members and administrators; I must consider city councilmen and state legislators, the city manager, the governor and the federal government, as well as alumni and parents...

As for the internal environment, we face a new movement of populism—the fragmentation of constituencies. On our campus we have more than 500 governance and interest groups, including a variety of women's groups, a gay lib, black organizations for students and for faculty members, and a faculty council for Jewish affairs...

I now have some 40 suits pending against the university, naming me as defendant. I can no longer make even a trivial decision without consulting our lawyers.

(Bennis, 1975, pp. 18, 20)
That power is abused, that power can corrupt, is not always the result of maliciousness. The complexity of organizations and the complexity of power itself make difficult the effective use of power. Because it has at least two edges, it is common to find bloody powerholders, bystanders, and organizations.
Power? What of it?

Where something ends up is often a function of where it started. This paper began with a discussion of the definitional ambiguity surrounding the concepts power, influence, and authority. Power was arbitrarily defined quite broadly as "the ability to get things done the way one wants them to be done" (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977, p. 4), in the context of formal organizations. Power, then, was construed as the ability of individuals or subunits to influence other individuals or subunits, or to affect processes such as resource allocation or decision making.

There are many sources of power, revolving around being in (or getting to) the right place, at the right time, with the right resources, and doing the right thing. In an organization, the "right place" involves being in a position (hierarchically or through location in the work flow) to deal with strategically important problems. Power is enhanced by nonsubstitutability and centrality. Being in the right place is of little value if the timing is wrong; getting a hold on a problem is not helpful if the resources to do something with it are unavailable. Control of resources, of course, is a major power base and covers an immense domain including information, people, rewards and punishments, equipment, personal assets, etc. Finally, successful action is a critical source of power.

Power is likely to be used when scarce and critical resources are involved, uncertainty surrounds goals and/or the means for achieving them, individuals or units have some discretion, and other interested parties do not overwhelm possible success. The tactics of power use are many and varied. Choice among them is contingent on the situation, the user's ability to diagnose situations and people, and the user's predispositions.

Using power has a variety of often contradictory impacts. It increases power, while at the same time it increases countervailing forces. It can solve problems and get things done, but leads to dysfunctional efforts to maintain or expand it as well as to attitude changes (such as devaluation of others). Because it is a tool, power can be used equally well for positive or negative ends (though there is a tendency to call it something else when noble goals are achieved through its use).

Certain general conclusions about power in an organizational context seem justified:
(1) Power exists whether we like it or not. The challenge is to channel it in ways that are productive, at the same time minimizing its negative aspects. Efforts to eliminate power are probably fruitless and are counterproductive if they reduce the ability of an organization to cope with changing environmental demands.

(2) Power is complex. Dismissing complexity as tautology avoids the issue. Power comes from many places, can be used in many ways for many purposes, and has a variety of good and bad impacts. Each of these elements interacts with the others. Research and theory have suffered because considering all aspects is exceedingly difficult, and focusing on only a few (for example, impact) is woefully incomplete.

(3) Power is dynamic. Its circular and contradictory nature creates tension between forces for change (e.g., environmental demands) and forces for stability (e.g., institutionalization). Because organizations change personnel, resources, structures, and so on—and because the environment changes in terms of problems, opportunities, and resources—power bases are constantly changing. The degree of tension affects the time lag for changes in power distribution, but change is inevitable.

(4) Power is neutral. The tendency to focus on abuse and corruption reflects only part of reality. The goodness or badness of the tactics employed and the goals sought are value judgments (albeit very important ones). Only by understanding how power works is it possible to direct it.

(5) Power is situational. The many facets of power, combined with the many situations in which it is used, point to the need for asking, "Power for what?" The relevance of a given power base, the appropriateness of various tactics, and the likely impacts of power use are intimately linked with each other and with the situation at hand. Is the goal to influence another person or group, or is it to influence a decision? How is the use of power in one situation likely to affect its use in future situations?

(6) Power is a two-edged sword. Having power is not all bliss, though it is perhaps a happier condition than its opposite. Power carries with it enormous responsibility for its use. The responsibility is not purely moral, but pragmatically few abusers of power escape forever the consequences of their acts. There is, too, pressure to use power. People expect powerholders to accomplish things, but as our presidential examples illustrate, that is not always easy to do. Since various constituents value different things, even "successful" power use is likely to alienate someone.
Conceptual Issues

The concept "power" is a muddy one. Not only are there glaring definitional problems, but the accumulated research is fragmented and hard to integrate. One way to test conceptual integrity is to differentiate one concept from others. With power, this is hard to do. For example, leadership is typically viewed as an influence process. Katz and Kahn (1966) defined leadership as incremental influence over and above the formal authority of the role. Does this mean that leadership is a subset of power? Pettigrew (1973) defined political behavior as "behavior of individuals, or...by subunits, within an organization that makes a claim against the resource-sharing system of the organization" (p. 17). How is that different from power?

Furthermore, power is implicated in virtually every topic in organizational behavior. Whether one is talking about group dynamics, motivation, organization design, organization change, conflict, decision making, etc., power is a relevant issue. Does that mean it should be subsumed by one of them, or they by it?

The answer to these questions is not obvious. If one chooses to view power as a separate construct, one thing is clear: It is pervasive and extremely complex. Much remains to be learned.

Enough is known about power, however, to suggest its importance to all of us. We all have power, and using well what we have requires understanding (1) what it is and (2) how to use it. Research on power provides a framework for interpreting experience. It is not a substitute for wisdom.
References


Kornberg, A., & Perry, S. D. Conceptual models of power and their applicability to empirical research in politics. Political Science, 1966, 18, 52-70.


Pettigrew, A. M. Information control as a power resource. Sociology, 1972, 6, 187-204.


Figure 1

Power - The State of the Art

Robert Bierstedt, 1950
In the entire lexicon of sociological concepts none is more trouble-
some than the concept of power . . . . We all know perfectly
well what it is--until someone asks us. (p. 730)

Robert Dahl, 1957
There are students of the subject . . . who think that . . . the
whole study of "power" is a bottomless swamp . . . . It is
probably too early to know whether these critics are right. (p. 201)

William Riker, 1964
We are still not at all sure of what we are talking about when we
use the term. (p. 341)

Allan Kornberg & Simon Perry, 1966
There exist almost as many definitions of power as there are
theorists writing on the subject. (p. 53)

William Pollard & Terence Mitchell, 1972
There are a number of conceptualizations of social power that
derive in emphasis and in scope, and the relationship of these
different views to each other is not clear. (p. 433)

James Tedeschi, 1972
The current status of theory and research in the areas of social
power and influence is clearly inadequate from almost anybody's
point of view. Hypotheses are ambiguously stated, research
programs continually end up in cul-de-sacs, and experiments take
on the character of isolated one-shot studies. (p. vii)

Andrew Pettigrew, 1973
There are as many different definitions of the concepts of
authority and power as there are of the concept of role. (p. 24)
DOONESBURY

TELL ME, HONEY—IS IT HARD TO CONVERSE WITH THE CHAIRMAN? I WAS TOLD HIS STROKE LEFT HIM WITH A SPEECH IMPAIRMENT.

YES, SIR. CHAIRMAN MAO HAS ALWAYS BEEN HARD TO UNDERSTAND BECAUSE HE SPEAKS AN OBSCURE RURAL IDIOM. AND NOW WITH THE STROKE, I SEEM TO BE THE ONLY TRANSLATOR WHO CAN STILL UNDERSTAND HIM.

NO KIDDING... MAN, THAT CERTAINLY LEAVES YOU WITH A HELL OF A RESPONSIBILITY, DOESN'T IT?

YES, SIR. IN A WAY, I'M SORT OF RUNNING THE COUNTRY. I'LL KEEP THAT IN MIND.

### Figure 3
Sixteen Strategies for Getting One's Way

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assertion</td>
<td>Forcefully asserting one's way</td>
<td>I voice my wishes loudly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bargaining</td>
<td>Explicit statement about reciprocating favors and making other two-way exchanges</td>
<td>I tell her that I'll do something for her if she'll do something for me.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compromise</td>
<td>Both agent and target give up part of their desired goals in order to obtain some of them</td>
<td>More often than not we come to some sort of compromise, if there is a disagreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceit</td>
<td>Attempts to fool the target into agreeing by the use of flattery or lies</td>
<td>I get my way by doing a good amount of fast talking and sometimes by some white lies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion-agent</td>
<td>Agent alters own facial expression</td>
<td>I put on a sweet face. I try to look sincere.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emotion-target</td>
<td>Agent attempts to alter emotions of target</td>
<td>I try to put him in a good mood.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evasion</td>
<td>Doing what one wants by avoiding the person who would disapprove</td>
<td>I got to read novels at work as long as the boss never saw me doing it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expertise</td>
<td>Claiming to have superior knowledge or skill</td>
<td>I tell them I have a lot of experience with such matters.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fait accompli</td>
<td>Openly doing what one wants without avoiding the target</td>
<td>I do what I want anyway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinting</td>
<td>Not openly stating what one wants; indirect attempts at influencing others</td>
<td>I drop hints. I subtly bring up a point.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persistence</td>
<td>Continuing in one's influence attempts or repeating one's point</td>
<td>I reiterate my point. I keep going despite all obstacles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persuasion</td>
<td>Simple statements about using persuasion, convincing, or coaxing</td>
<td>I get my way by convincing others that my way is best.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason</td>
<td>Any statement about using reason or rational argument to influence others</td>
<td>I argue logically. I tell all the reasons why my plan is best.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Simple statement</td>
<td>Without supporting evidence or threats, a matter-of-fact statement of one's desires</td>
<td>I simply tell him what I want.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thought manipulation</td>
<td>Making the target think that the agent's way is the target's own idea</td>
<td>I usually try to get my way by making the other person feel that it is his idea.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat</td>
<td>Stating that negative consequences will occur if the agent's plan is not accepted</td>
<td>I'll tell him I will never speak to him again if he doesn't do what I want.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4

Influence Techniques Used By Purchasing Agents

1. Rule-oriented tactics
   a. Appeal to some common authority to direct that the requisition
      be revised or withdrawn.
   b. Refer to some rule (assuming one exists) which provides for
      longer lead times.
   c. Require the scheduling department to state in writing why quick
      delivery is required.
   d. Require the requisitioning department to consent to having its
      budget charged with the extra cost (such as air freight) re-
      quired to get quick delivery.

2. Rule-evading tactics
   a. Go through the motions of complying with the request, but with
      no expectation of getting delivery on time.
   b. Exceed formal authority and ignore the requisitions altogether.

3. Personal-political tactics
   a. Rely on friendships to induce the scheduling department to
      modify the requisition.
   b. Rely on favors, past and future, to accomplish the same result.
   c. Work through political allies in other departments.

4. Educational tactics
   a. Use direct persuasion; that is, try to persuade scheduling that
      its requisition is unreasonable.
   b. Use what might be called indirect persuasion to help scheduling
      see the problem from the purchasing department's point of view
      (in this case it might ask the scheduler to sit in and observe
      the agent's difficulty in trying to get the vendor to agree to
      quick delivery).

5. Organizational-interactional tactics
   a. Seek to change the interaction pattern; for example, have the
      scheduling department check with the purchasing department as
      to the possibility of getting quick delivery before it makes a
      requisition.
   b. Seek to take over other departments; for example, to subordinate
      scheduling to purchasing in an integrated materials department.

## Figure 5
Methods of Influence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Face-to-face methods</th>
<th>What they can influence</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Drawbacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exercise obligation-based power.</td>
<td>Behavior within zone that the other perceives as legitimate in light of the obligation.</td>
<td>Quick. Requires no outlay of tangible resources.</td>
<td>If the request is outside the acceptable zone, it will fail; if it is too far outside, others might see it as illegitimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise power based on perceived expertise.</td>
<td>Attitudes and behavior within the zone of perceived expertise.</td>
<td>Quick. Requires no outlay of tangible resources.</td>
<td>If the request is outside the acceptable zone, it will fail; if it is too far outside, others might see it as illegitimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise power based on identification with a manager.</td>
<td>Attitudes and behavior that are not in conflict with the ideals that underlie the identification.</td>
<td>Quick. Requires no expenditure of limited resources.</td>
<td>Restricted to influence attempts that are not in conflict with the ideals that underlie the identification.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exercise power based on perceived dependence.</td>
<td>Wide range of behavior that can be monitored.</td>
<td>Quick. Can often succeed when other methods fail.</td>
<td>Repeated influence attempts encourage the other to gain power over the influencer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coercively exercise power based on perceived dependence.</td>
<td>Wide range of behavior that can be easily monitored.</td>
<td>Quick. Can often succeed when other methods fail.</td>
<td>Invites retaliation. Very risky.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use persuasion.</td>
<td>Very wide range of attitudes and behavior.</td>
<td>Can produce internalized motivation that does not require monitoring. Requires no power or outlay of scarce material resources.</td>
<td>Can be very time-consuming. Requires other person to listen.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Combine these methods. | Depends on the exact combination. | Can be more potent and less risky than using a single method. | More costly than using a single method. |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indirect methods</th>
<th>What they can influence</th>
<th>Advantages</th>
<th>Drawbacks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manipulate the other's environment by using any or all of the face-to-face methods.</td>
<td>Wide range of behavior and attitudes.</td>
<td>Can succeed when face-to-face methods fail.</td>
<td>Can be time-consuming, is complex to implement. Is very risky, especially if used frequently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change the forces that continuously act on the individual: Formal organizational arrangements. Informal social arrangements. Technology. Resources available. Statement of organizational goals.</td>
<td>Wide range of behavior and attitudes on a continuous basis.</td>
<td>Has continuous influence, not just a one-shot effect. Can have a very powerful impact.</td>
<td>Often requires a considerable power outlay to achieve.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Figure 6
Classification of Influence Tactics

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Powerholder Intends to:</th>
<th>Openly Influence Target</th>
<th>Manipulate Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Yes</strong></td>
<td>Threats and promises (A)</td>
<td>Reinforcement control (B)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Powerholder controls resources</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Persuasion, noncontingent promises, or threats (C)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank Norma Kay for her extensive inputs to this paper. Further thanks to Vernon Odom, Mike Lombardo, David DeVries, Elizabeth Conklyn, and Ann Morrison for their guidance and advice. Sheila Bell and Joanne Ferguson deserve a special acknowledgement for their patience with the manuscript.
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